We consider the problem of …nding policy function improvements for a single agent in highdimensional dynamic games where the strategies are restricted to be Markovian. Conventional solution methods are not computationally feasible when the state space is high-dimensional. In this paper, we apply a method recently proposed by Bajari, Jiang, and Manzanares (2015) to solve for policy function improvements in a high-dimensional entry game similar to that studied by Holmes (2011). The game we consider has a state variable vector with an average cardinality of over 10 85 . The method we propose combines ideas from literatures in Machine Learning and the econometric analysis of games to …nd a one-step policy improvement. We …nd that our algorithm results in a nearly 300 percent improvement in expected pro…ts as compared to a benchmark strategy.
Introduction
Many dynamic games of interest in economics have state spaces that are potentially very large, and solution algorithms considered in the economics literature do not scale to problems of this size.
Consider the game of Chess, which is a two-player board game involving sequential moves on a board consisting of 64 squares. Since games end after the maximum allowable 50 number of moves, solving for pure Markov-perfect equilibrium strategies is in principle achievable using backward induction, since all allowable positions of pieces and moves could be mapped into an extensive form game tree. 1 In practice, however, there are at least two challenges to implementing this type of solution method.
The …rst challenge is the high number of possible branches in the game tree. For example, an upper bound on the number of possible terminal nodes is on the order of 10 46 . 2 Fully solving for equilibrium strategies requires computing and storing state transition probabilities at each of a very large number of nodes, which is both analytically and computationally intractable.
The second challenge is deriving the strategies of opponents. Equilibrium reasoning motivates …xed-point methods for deriving equilibrium best responses. However, it is not clear that equilibrium assumptions will generate good approximations of opponent play in Chess, since players may engage in suboptimal strategies, making Nash-style best responses derived a priori possibly suboptimal. Similarly, it is not clear whether developing and solving a stylized version of Chess would produce strategies relevant for playing the game.
Recently, researchers in computer science and arti…cial intelligence have made considerable progress deriving strategies for very complex dynamic games such as Chess using a general approach very di¤erent from that used by economists, which has two broad themes. First, to derive player strategies, they rely more heavily on data of past game play than on equilibrium assumptions.
Second, instead of focusing on deriving optimal strategies, they focus on continually improving upon the best strategies previously implemented by other researchers or game practitioners. This general approach has provided a series of successful strategies for complex games. 3 In this paper, we illustrate an approach recently proposed by Bajari, Jiang, and Manzanares (BJM, 2015) which proceeds in this spirit, combining ideas developed by researchers in computer science and arti…cial intelligence with those developed by econometricians for studying dynamic games to solve for policy improvements for a single agent in high-dimensional dynamic games, 1 Recently, researchers have found that this is even more complicated for games like Chess, which may have no uniform Nash equilibria in pure or even mixed positional strategies. See Boros, Gurvich and Yamangil (2013) for this assertion. 2 See Chinchalkar (1996) . 3 These include, inter-alia, the strategy of the well-publicized computer program "Deep Blue"(developed by IBM), which was the …rst machine to beat a reigning World Chess Champion, and the counterfactual regret-minimization algorithm for the complex multi-player game Texas Hold'em developed by Bowling, Burch, Johanson and Tammelin (2015) , which has been shown to beat successful players in practice.
where strategies are restricted to be Markovian. For our illustration, we consider the problem of computing a one-step improvement policy for a single retailer in the game considered in Holmes (2011) . He considers the decision by chain store retailers of where to locate physical stores. We add to his model the decision of where to locate distribution centers as well. In our game, there are 227 physical locations in the United States and two rival retailers, which each seek to maximize nation-wide pro…ts over seven years by choosing locations for distribution centers and stores.
This game is complicated for several reasons. First, store location decisions generate both own …rm and competitor …rm spillovers. On the one hand, for a given …rm, clustering stores in locations near distribution centers lowers distribution costs. On the other hand, it also cannibalizes own store revenues, since consumers substitute between nearby stores. For the same reason, nearby competitor stores lower revenues for a given store. Second, the game is complicated because it is dynamic, since we make distribution center and store decisions irreversible. This forces …rms to consider strategies such as spatial preemption, whereby …rm entry in earlier time periods in ‡uences the pro…tability of these locations in future time periods.
Using the algorithm of BJM, we derive a one-step improvement policy for a hypothetical retailer and show that our algorithm generates a 289 percent improvement over a strategy designed to approximate the actual facility location patterns of Wal-Mart. This algorithm can be characterized by two attributes that make it useful for deriving strategies to play complex games. First, instead of deriving player strategies using equilibrium assumptions, they utilize data on a large number of previous plays of the game. Second, they employ an estimation technique from Machine Learning that reduces the dimensionality of the game in a data-driven manner, which simultaneously makes estimation feasible.
The data provides them with sequences of actions and states, indexed by time, and the assumption that strategies are Markovian allows them to model play in any particular period as a function of a set of payo¤ relevant state variables. 4 Using this data, they estimate opponent strategies as a function of the state, as well as a law of motion. They also borrow from the literature on the econometrics of games and estimate the choice-speci…c value function, making the choice-speci…c value function the dependent variable in an econometric model. 5 After …xing the strategy of the agent for all time periods beyond the current time period using a benchmark strategy, they use the estimated opponent strategies and law of motion to simulate and then estimate the value of a one-period deviation from the agent's strategy in the current period. 6 This estimate is used to 4 We note that in principle there is some scope to test the Markov assumption. For example, we could do a hypothesis test of whether information realized prior to the current period is signi…cant after controlling for all payo¤ relevant states in the current period. 5 See Pesendorfer and Schmidt-Dengler (2008) for an example using this approach. Also see Bajari, Hong, and Nekipelov (2013) for a survey on recent advances in game theory and econometrics. 6 In practice, the benchmark strategy could represent a previously proposed strategy that represents the highest payo¤s agents have been able to …nd in practice. For example, in spectrum auctions, we might use the well known "straightforward bidding" strategy or the strategy proposed by Bulow, Levin, and Milgrom (2009) . construct a one-step improvement policy by maximizing the choice-speci…c value function in each period as a function of the state, conditional on playing the benchmark strategy in all time periods beyond the current one.
Since the settings we consider involve a large number of state variables, estimating opponent strategies, the law of motion, and the choice-speci…c value function in this algorithm is infeasible using conventional methods. For example, in our spatial location game, one way to enumerate the current state is to de…ne it as a vector of indicator variables representing the national network of distribution center and store locations for both …rms. This results in a state vector that contains 1817 variables and achieves an average cardinality in each time period on the order of 10 85 . 7 Although this enumeration allows us to characterize opponent strategies, the law of motion, and choice-speci…c value functions of this game as completely non-parametric functions of the state variables, it is potentially computationally wasteful and generates three estimation issues. First, the large cardinality of the state vector makes it unlikely that these models are identi…ed. 8 Second, if they are identi…ed, they are often ine¢ ciently estimated since there are usually very few observations for any given permutation of the state vector. Moreover, when estimating the choice-speci…c value function, remedying these issues by increasing the scale of the simulation is computationally infeasible. Third, when the number of regressors is large, researchers often …nd in practice that many of these regressors are highly multicollinear, and in the context of collinear regressors, out-of-sample prediction is often maximized using a relatively small number of regressors. To the extent that some state variables are relatively unimportant, these estimation and computational issues motivate the use of well-speci…ed approximations. However, in high-dimensional settings, it is often di¢ cult to know a priori which state variables are important.
As a consequence, we utilize a technique from Machine Learning which makes estimation and simulation in high-dimensional contexts feasible through an approximation algorithm that selects 7 1817 = 227 2 (own distribution center indicators for two merchandise classes) + 227 2 (own store indicators for two types of stores) + 227 2 (opponent distribution center indicators for two merchandise classes) + 227 2 (opponent store indicators for two types of stores) + 1 (location-speci…c population variable). The state space cardinality for the second time period is calculated as follows. In each time period, we constrain the number of distribution centers and stores that each …rm can open, and at the start of the game (in the …rst time period), we allocate …rm facilities randomly as described in the Appendix. Only locations not currently occupied by …rm i facilities of the same type are feasible. In the …rst time period, the number of feasible locations for placing facilities of each type in the second time period include: 220, 226, 211, and 203, and among available locations, each …rm chooses 4 distribution centers and 8 stores of each type. The order of the resulting cardinality of the state space in the second period (only including the cardinality of the state attributable to …rm i facilities; also not including the cardinality of the population variable) is the product of the possible combinations of distribution centers and store locations of each type, i.e. 220 4 226 4 211 8 203 8 10 7 10 7 10 13 10 13 = 10 43 . The cardinality of the state attributable to …rm i facilities is calculated in a similar manner, and the total cardinality of the state (not considering the population variable) is the product of the cardinality attributable to …rm i and i facilities. State space cardinality calculations attributable to …rm i facilities for all time periods are available in the Appendix. 8 For example, estimating parameters using ordinary least squares requires us to solve the closed-form formula (X 0 X) 1 (X 0 Y ), which is not even identi…ed if the number of observations is less than the number of regressors, which is often the case in high-dimensional dynamic games.
the parsimonious set of state variables most relevant for predicting our outcomes of interest. Machine Learning refers to a set of methods developed and used by computer scientists and statisticians to estimate models when both the number of observations and controls is large, and these methods have proven very useful in practice for predicting accurately in cross-sectional settings. 9 In our illustration, we utilize a Machine Learning method known as Component Wise Gradient Boosting (CWGB), which we describe in detail in Section 4. 10 As with many other Machine Learning methods, CWGB works by projecting the estimand functions of interest onto a low-dimensional set of parametric basis functions of regressors, with the regressors and basis functions chosen in a data-driven manner. As a result of the estimation process, CWGB often reduces the number of state variables dramatically, and we …nd that these parsimonious approximations perform well in our application, suggesting that many state representations in economics might be computationally wasteful. For example, we …nd that choice-speci…c value functions in our spatial location game are well-approximated by between 6 and 7 state variables (chosen from the original 1817).
Our algorithm contributes a data-driven method for deriving policy improvements in highdimensional dynamic Markov games which can be used to play these games in practice. 11 It also extends a related literature in approximate dynamic programming (ADP). ADP is a set of methods developed primarily by engineers to study Markov decision processes in high-dimensional settings.
See Bertsekas (2012) for an extensive survey of this …eld. Within this literature, our approach is most related to the rollout algorithm, which is a technique that also generates a one-step improvement policy based on a choice-speci…c value function estimated using simulation. See Bertsekas (2013) for a survey of these algorithms. Although originally developed to solve for improvement policies in dynamic engineering applications, the main idea of rollout algorithms-obtaining an improved policy starting from another suboptimal policy using a one-time improvement-has been applied to Markov games by Abramson (1990) and Tesauro and Galperin (1996) . We appear to be the …rst to formalize the idea of estimating opponent strategies and the law of motion as inputs into the simulation and estimation of the choice-speci…c value function when applying rollout to multi-agent Markov games. This is facilitated by separating the impact of opponent strategies on the probability of state transitions from the payo¤ function in the continuation value term of the Hastie and Tibshirani (2009) for an introduction to the method. We choose this method because among the methods considered, it had the highest level of accuracy in out-of-sample prediction. We note that there are relatively few results about "optimal" estimators in high-dimensional settings. In practice, researchers most often use out-of-sample …t as a criteria for deciding between estimators. CWGB methods can accommodate non-linearity in the data generating process, are computationally simple, and, unlike many other non-linear estimators, are not subject to problems with convergence in practice. 1 1 High-dimensional dynamic games include, for example, Chess, Go, spectrum auctions, and the entry game we study in this paper. choice-speci…c value function, which is a separation commonly employed in the econometrics of games literature. Additionally, we extend the rollout literature by using an estimator that selects regressors in a data-driven manner.
We note that in practice there are several limitations to the approach we describe. A …rst is that we do not derive an equilibrium of the game. Hence we are unable to address the classic questions of comparative statics if we change the environment. That said, to the best of our knowledge, the problem of how to …nd equilibrium in games with very large state spaces has not been solved in general. We do suspect that …nding a computationally feasible way to derive policy improvements in this setting may be useful as researchers make …rst steps in attacking this problem. A second limitation is that we assume opponent strategies are …xed. 12 A third limitation is that our policy improvement is derived using an approximated choice-speci…c value function, which may make it suboptimal. 13 That said, it is not clear that equilibrium theory is a particularly useful guide to play in these settings, even if theory tells us that equilibrium exists and is unique. The spirit of the analysis is that "it takes a model to beat a model." In practical situations, economic actors or policy makers must make decisions despite these obstacles. In economics, much of the guidance has been based on solving very stylized versions of these games analytically or examining the behavior of subjects in laboratory experiments. Our method complements these approaches by providing strategies useful for playing games in high-dimensional settings. Arti…cial intelligence and computer science researchers, along with decision makers in industry and policy have used data as an important input into deriving strategies to play games. We believe that our example shows that certain economic problems may bene…t from the intensive use of data and modeling based on econometrics and Machine Learning.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. The next section provides background information on chain store retailers and the game we study. Section 3 characterizes the game as a dynamic model. Section 4 provides details on our algorithm for deriving a one-step policy improvement, and Section 5 presents and discusses the results of our simulation. Section 6 concludes.
Institutional Background and Data
According to the U.S. Census, U.S. retail sales in 2012 totaled $4.87 trillion, representing 30 percent of nominal U.S. GDP. The largest retailer, Wal-Mart, dominates retail trade, with sales 1 2 In practice, this problem is mitigated to some extent, since researchers can re-estimate opponent strategies in each period and use our method to derive new policy improvements. 1 3 We are unaware of proofs of optimal (i.e. minimum variance) estimators for high dimensional problems. All we know is that the method we propose predicts better than other methods we have tried. There is very little theory in Machine Learning that allows one to rank estimators on a priori grounds. As a result, there may be a better model based on an alternative approach to prediction that may be superior. accounting for 7 percent of the U.S. total in 2012. 14 Wal-Mart is not only the largest global retailer, it is also the largest company by total revenues of any kind in the world. 15 Notwithstanding their importance in the global economy, there has been a relative scarcity of papers in the literature studying chain store retailers in a way that explicitly models the multi-store dimension of chain store networks, primarily due to modeling di¢ culties. 16 Wal-Mart, along with other large chain store retailers such as Target, Costco or Kmart, operate large networks of physical store and distribution center locations around the world and compete in several product lines, including general merchandise and groceries, and via several store types, including regular stores, supercenters, and discount warehouse club stores. For example, by the end of 2014, Wal-Mart had 42 distribution centers and 4203 stores in the U.S., with each distribution center supporting from 90 to 100 stores within a 200-mile radius. 17 In this paper, we model a game similar to the one considered by Holmes (2011) , who studies the physical store location decisions of Wal-Mart. Our game consists of two competing chain store retailers which seek to open a network of stores and distribution centers from the years t = 2000; :::; 2006 across a …nite set of possible physical locations in the United States. 18 One location corresponds to a metropolitan statistical area (MSA) as de…ned by the U.S. Census Bureau and is indexed by l = 1; :::; L, with L = 227 possible locations. 19 We extend the game in Holmes At a given time period t, each …rm i will have stores and distribution centers in a subset of locations, observes the facility network of the competitor as well as the current population of each 1 4 Total U.S. retail sales collected from the Annual Retail Trade Survey (1992-2012), available: http://www.census.gov/retail/. Wal-Mart share of retail sales collected from the National Retail Federation, Top 100 Retailers (2013), available: https://nrf.com/resources/top-retailers-list/top-100-retailers-2013. 1 5 Fortune Global 500 list (2014), available: http://fortune.com/global500/. 1 6 For recent exceptions, see Aguirregabiria and Vicentini (2014), Holmes (2011), Jia (2008), Ellickson, Houghton, and Timmins (2013), and Nishida (2014). 1 7 The total number of stores …gure excludes Wal-Mart's 632 Sam's Club discount warehouse club stores. 1 8 Throughout the paper, we use the notation t = 2000; :::; 2006 and t = 1; :::; T with T = 7 interchangeably. 1 9 Census Bureau, County Business Patterns, Metropolitan Statistical Areas, 1998 to 2012. Available at: http://www.census.gov/econ/cbp/. All raw data used in this paper, which includes a list of MSA's used, is available from: http://abv8.me/4bL. 2 0 Additionally, each …rm operates import distribution centers located around the country, where each import distribution center supplies both food and general merchandise distribution centers. We abstract away from decisions regarding import distribution center placement, …xing and making identical the number and location of import distribution centers for both …rms. Speci…cally, we place import distribution centers for each competitor in the locations in our sample closest to the actual import distribution center locations of Wal-Mart during the same time period. See the Appendix for details.
MSA, and decides in which locations to open new distribution centers and stores in period t + 1.
We collect MSA population and population density data from the US Census Bureau. 21 As in Holmes (2011), we focus on location decisions and abstract away from the decision of how many facilities to open in each period. Instead, we constrain each competitor to open the same number of distribution centers of each category actually opened by Wal-Mart annually in the United States from 2000 to 2006, with the exact locations and opening dates collected from data made publicly available by an operational logistics consulting …rm. 22 We also constrain each competitor to open two supercenters for each newly opened food distribution center and two regular stores for each newly opened general merchandise distribution center. 23 Finally, we use the distribution center data to endow our competitor with a location strategy meant to approximate Wal-Mart's actual expansion patterns as documented by Holmes (2011) , which involved opening a store in a relatively central location in the U.S., opening additional stores in a pattern that radiated from this central location out, and never placing a store in a far-o¤ location and …lling the gap in between. This pattern is illustrated in Figure 1 . 24 
Game Model
In this section, we de…ne the game formally and characterize the choice-speci…c value function.
State. We de…ne two state vectors, one that is "nation-wide" and another that is "local."
The nation-wide state represents the network of distribution centers and stores in period t for both competitors, as well as the period t populations for all locations. De…ne the set of locations as L f1; :::; Lg and the vectors enumerating nation-wide locations for food distribution centers (f ), general merchandise distribution centers (g), regular stores (r), and supercenters (sc) as s f it , s g it ,s r it , and s sc it , where s q it s q i1t ; :::; s q iLt for q 2 ff; g; r; scg and where s q ilt = 1 if …rm i has placed a facility of type q in location l at time t, 0 otherwise. Further, de…ne the vector enumerating nationwide location populations as x t (x 1t ; :::; x Lt ), where each x lt 2 N represents location-speci…c population. We de…ne the following nation-wide state:
Our population density measure is constructed using MSA population divided by MSA land area by square miles in 2010, both collected from the U.S. Census Bureau. Population data by MSA was obtained from the Metropolitan Population Statistics, available: http://www.census.gov/population/metro/data/index.html. Land area in square miles by MSA in 2010 was obtained from the Patterns of Metropolitan and Micropolitan Population Change: 2000 to 2010, available: http://www.census.gov/population/metro/data/pop_data.html. 2 2 This included thirty food distribution centers and …fteen general merchandise distribution centers. Wal-Mart distribution center locations with opening dates were obtained from MWPVL International, available: http://www.mwpvl.com/html/walmart.html. We also provide a list in the Appendix. 2 3 This results in a total of sixty supercenters and thirty regular stores opened over the course of the game by each …rm. 2 4 Data prepared by Holmes (2011), available: http://www.econ.umn.edu/~holmes/data/WalMart/.
where represents the Cartesian product, S t represents the support of s t , i denotes the competitor …rm, and f0; 1g 8L represents the 8 L-ary Cartesian product over 8 L sets f0; 1g, and N L represents the L-ary Cartesian product over L sets of natural numbers N. We also de…ne a location-speci…c state:
Note that this state is identical to the nation-wide state except for the population variable, which is location-speci…c.
Actions. As described in Section 2, we force each competitor to open a pre-speci…ed aggregate number of distribution centers and stores in each period, denoted as the vector n t n f t ; n g t ; n r t ; n sc t , where n q t 2 N for q 2 ff; g; r; scg represents the number of food distribution centers, general merchandise distribution centers, regular stores, and supercenters, respectively, that each competitor must open in period t + 1. 25 The set of feasible locations is constrained by the period t state, since for a given facility type q, …rm i can open at most one facility per location. 26 Further, we restrict …rms to open at most one own store of any kind in each MSA, with …rms each choosing regular stores prior to supercenters in period t. The choices of facility locations for each facility type are denoted as a f it , a g it , a r it , and a sc it , where a q it a q i1t ; :::; a q iLt and where a q ilt = 1 if …rm i chooses location l to place a facility of type q 2 ff; g; r; scg in period t + 1, 0 otherwise. We de…ne 
for all q 9 > = > ;
We abuse notation by suppressing the dependence of feasible actions on the state (and on regular store actions, in the case of supercenters). Also, we assume that once opened, distribution centers and stores are never closed. 27
Law of Motion. Since we assume the state is comprised of only the current network of facilities and populations, rather than their entire history, this game is Markov. Often, the law of motion is random and can be represented as a probability distribution over the state in t + 1 conditional on 2 5 This vector takes the following values in our game: n2000 = (4; 4; 8; 8), n2001 = (5; 2; 4; 10), n2002 = (6; 1; 2; 12), n2003 = (2; 3; 6; 4), n2004 = (3; 3; 6; 6), and n2005 = (3; 1; 2; 6). Note that these vectors each represent facility openings for the next period, e.g. n2000 designates the number of openings to be realized in t = 2001. 2 6 See the Appendix for details. 2 7 As documented by Holmes (2011) and http://www.mwpvl.com/html/walmart.html, Wal-Mart rarely closes stores and distribution centers once opened, making this assumption a reasonable approximation for large chain store retailers. the current period state and actions. In our application, since we assume both …rms have perfect foresight with respect to x t , the law of motion is a deterministic function of the current state and actions for both …rms, i.e. it represents the mapping S t A it A it ! S t+1 , which we denote by making s t+1 explicitly conditional on s t , a it , and a it , i.e. s t+1 (s t ; a it ; a it ). This mapping implies the the location-speci…c mapping S lt A it A it ! S lt+1 , which we denote as s lt+1 (s lt ; a it ; a it ).
Strategies. In Markov decision process games, each player forms strategies that are mappings from current period states to feasible actions, called policy functions. Speci…cally, de…ne the period t policy function for …rm i as it : S t ! A it . We also de…ne the period t policy function for i observes the period t action choice for player i in period t + 1. From the perspective of player i, the strategy function of player i generates an associated probability function p (a it js t ) it
for all s t 2 S t and all t. For notational simplicity, we abuse notation by suppressing the dependence of it on s t and it on s t and O it . Further de…ne the vector of policy functions for a reference player i for all time periods beyond the current time period as it+1 ( it+1 ; :::; iT 1 ) and the vector of policy functions for player i for all time periods including the current time period as it ( it ; :::; iT 1 ), respectively.
Period Return. In period t, each …rm i receives a payo¤ in the form of operating pro…ts across all stores in its network, denoted as it
represents operating pro…ts for a store opened in location l. The functions ilt (s lt ) for l = 1; :::; L are parametric and deterministic functions of the current location-speci…c state s lt and are similar to the operating pro…ts speci…ed by Holmes (2011) . Since customers substitute demand among nearby stores, operating pro…ts in a given location are a function of both own and competitor facility presence in nearby locations. They are also a function of location-speci…c variable costs, distribution costs, population, and population density. 28
Choice-Speci…c Value Function. Let be a discount factor. For notational simplicity,
We de…ne a "local" facility and choice-speci…c value function, which is de…ned as the period t location-speci…c value of opening facility q 2 ff; g; r; scg in location l for …rm i, i.e.
where,
and where the notation a it a q ilt re ‡ects the dependence of the period t action across all locations on the local facility choice a q ilt , and s 1 a q ilt for = t+2; :::; T re ‡ects the dependence of all states beyond period t on the local facility choice a q ilt . In de…nition 1, V q it (:) represents location and facility choice-speci…c expected pro…ts over all time periods conditional on potentially suboptimal choices by …rm i in periods t + 1; :::; T 1, the expectation E it [:] is taken over all feasible realizations of …rm i actions in period t as generated by it , and each a i for = t + 1; :::; T 1 is chosen by …rm i's period policy function i . 29
Policy Function Improvement
We adapt the algorithm of BJM (2015) to derive a one-step improvement policy over a benchmark strategy (de…ned below), which involves …ve steps. These steps include: 1) estimating the strategies of competitors and the law of motion using a Machine Learning estimator, 2) …xing an initial strategy for the agent for time periods beyond the current time period, 3) using the estimated competitor strategies, law of motion, and …xed agent strategy to simulate play, 4) using this simulated data to estimate the choice-speci…c value function using a Machine Learning estimator, and 5) obtaining a one-step improvement policy.
Opponent Strategies and the Law of Motion (Algorithm Step 1). The method of BJM (2015) assumes researchers have access to data that details states and actions over many plays of the game. Using this data, they propose estimating reduced-form models corresponding to competitor strategies and if necessary, the law of motion, using the Component-Wise Gradient Boosting (CWGB) method (detailed in Algorithm Step 2) to reduce the dimensionality of the state vector in a data-driven manner. 30 In our illustration, we do not estimate models corresponding to opponent strategies. Instead, we force the competitor to open distribution centers in the exact locations and at the exact times chosen by Wal-Mart from 2000 to 2006, placing stores in the MSA's closest to these distribution centers. For purposes of describing the simulation procedure 2 9 The choice-speci…c value function is also conditional on a set of pro…t parameters, which is a dependence we suppress to simplify the notation. Details regarding all parameters are presented in the Appendix. 3 0 In a given application, if the action space is also high-dimensional, researchers may want to estimate reducedform models for Pr a q ilt jst it for each t (or one model using data pooled across t), or, similarly, Pr a q ilt js lt it , which utilizes cross-sectional di¤erences in location-speci…c characteristics (e.g., location-speci…c population as in our illustration). more generally, we abuse notation by denoting the reduced-form probability of choice a it induced by opponent strategy it as estimated, i.e. b p (a it je s lt ) it , where e s lt 2 e S lt S lt represents the regularized location-speci…c state vector produced through the CWGB estimation process, and b p (:) it is a degenerate probability function, i.e. b p (a it je s lt ) it Pr ( it = a it je s lt ) it = 1 for some a it 2 A it given any e s lt 2 e S lt , for all t. 31 Also, we do not estimate a law of motion, since it is deterministic in our example. 32 See the Appendix for details.
Initial Strategy for Agent (Algorithm Step 2). The second step involves …xing an initial strategy for the agent in all time periods beyond the current time period t, i.e., choosing the vector of policy functions it+1 . 33 In our illustration, in every time period, we choose distribution center locations randomly over all remaining MSA's not currently occupied by an own-…rm general merchandise or food distribution center, respectively (the number chosen per period is constrained as previously described). We then open regular stores and supercenters in the closest feasible MSA's to these distribution centers exactly as described for the competitor.
Simulating Play (Algorithm Step 3). We simulate play for the game using b p (a it je s lt ) it for t = 1; :::; T 1, the law of motion, and it+1 . Denote simulated variables with the superscript . We generate an initial state s 1 by 1) for the agent, randomly placing distribution centers around the country and placing stores in the MSA's closest to these distribution centers, and 2) for the competitor, placing distribution centers in the exact locations chosen by Wal-Mart in the year 2000 and placing stores in the MSA's closest to these distribution centers. 34 We then generate period t = 1 actions. For the competitor, we choose locations a i1 according to b p (a i1 je s l1 ) i1 . 35 For the agent, we randomly choose either a q il1 = 1 or a q il1 = 0 for each facility q 2 ff; g; r; scg and l = 1; :::; L with equal probability by drawing from a uniform random variable. These choices specify the state in period t = 2, i.e. s 2 . We choose each a it and a it for t = 2; :::; T 1 using it+1 and b p (a it je s lt ) it , respectively. For each location l and period t = 1; :::; T 1, we calculate the expected pro…ts generated by each choice a q ilt 2 f0; 1g, i.e. the simulated sums:
3 1 We abuse the notation of e s lt by ignoring that the state variables retained by CWGB can be di¤erent across each estimated model b p (:) i1 ; :::; b p (:) iT 1 . 3 2 For a detailed discussion of how to estimate models corresponding to opponent strategies and the law of motion in high-dimensional settings, we refer the interested reader to BJM (2015). 3 3 Although it+1 can be any sub-optimal or optimal vector of policies, a particularly suboptimal choice for it+1 may result in worse performance of the one-step improvement generated in Algorithm Step 5. We are unaware of general theoretical results governing the choice of it+1 in high-dimensional settings. 3 4 This results in seven food distribution centers, one general merchandise distribution center, two regular stores, and fourteen supercenters allocated in the initial state (year=2000). In all speci…cations, store placement proceeds as follows. We open regular stores in the two closest feasible MSA's to each newly opened …rm i general merchandise distribution center. After making this decision, we determine the closest …rm i general merchandise distribution center to each newly opened …rm i food distribution center and open supercenters in the two feasible MSA's closest to the centroid of each of these distribution center pairs. 3 5 If b p (a i1j e s l1 ) i1 were estimated, we would randomly draw upon this estimated probability.
where, Estimating Choice-Speci…c Value Function (Algorithm Step 4). We focus on eight estimands, V q i s lt ; a q ilt ; it+1 for each q 2 ff; g; r; scg and choice a q ilt 2 f0; 1g. 37 If there is smoothness in the value function, this allows us to pool information from across our simulations in Algorithm
Step 3 to reduce variance in our estimator. Note that the simulated choice speci…c value function will be equal to the choice speci…c value function plus a random error due to simulation. If we have an unbiased estimator, adding error to the dependent variable of a regression does not result in a biased estimator. Since s lt is high-dimensional, this estimation is infeasible or undesirable using a …xed-regressor estimation method. Instead, we use a Component-Wise Gradient Boosting (CWGB) estimator, which simultaneously regularizes the state vector as a consequence of the estimation process. CWGB estimators are popular Machine Learning methods that can accommodate the estimation of both linear and nonlinear models in the presence of a large number of regressors and can employ either regression or regression-tree basis functions. 38 In our illustration, we use and describe a linear variant of CWGB, which works according to the following steps. 39 1. Initialize the iteration 0 model, denoted as b V q;c=0 i , by setting b V q;c=0 i = 0. 3 6 In our application, in each period t, b p (a itj e s lt ) it is degenerate, and E it [:] simpli…es to 3 7 We focus on the estimand V q i (s lt ; a q ilt ; it+1), which is conditional on s lt , rather than V q i (st; a q ilt ; it+1), which is conditional on st, in order to take advantage of cross-sectional di¤erences in value across locations. Although this simpli…cation is not necessary for implementing the algorithm, it greatly reduces the simulation burden, since each individual simulation e¤ectively provides 227 sample observations rather than 1. 3 8 For a survey of boosting methods, see Hastie, Tibshirani, and Friedman (2009). We choose the linear regression based version of CWGB over tree-based versions because of the linear regression version's computational e¢ ciency and interpretability. 3 9 In our context, we use the glmboost function available in the mboost package of R to compute the CWGB estimate. See Hofner et al. (2014) for a tutorial on model-based boosting in R.
2.
Recall the de…nition of s lt , which is a vector containing 1817 variables. 40 In the …rst step, we estimate 1817 individual univariate linear models (without intercepts) of the relationship between each simulated state variable with the corresponding location-speci…c simulated expected pro…t, i.e. V q it , as the outcome variable. We denote these univariate models as Update the iteration 2 model as b 
Continue in a similar manner for a …xed number of iterations. The number of iterations is
typically chosen using out-of-sample cross-validation. We use 1000 iterations.
As a consequence of the CWGB method, some state variables are never selected as part of a best …t model in any iteration. If this is the case, the CWGB discards this state variable in the model that remains after all iterations, e¤ectively performing data-driven state variable selection.
In most cases, this process drastically reduces the number of state variables. For example, in our estimation exercises, on average, the CWGB procedure reduces the number of state variables from 1817 to 7. We denote these regularized state vectors as e s qa lt 2 e S qa lt S lt for each q and a = a q ilt and the models produced by CWGB as b V q i e s qa lt ; a q ilt ; it+1 for q 2 ff; g; r; scg and choice a q ilt 2 f0; 1g, noting that they provide estimates of the location-speci…c value for …rm i generated by a facility placement choice of type q.
One-
Step Improvement Policy (Algorithm Step 5). We seek a one-step improvement policy for …rm i, denoted as 1 i , which represents the vector of policy functions each which maximizes 4 0 The vector s lt consists 0; 1 indicators of own and competitor regular store entry (227 2 variables), own and competitor supercenter entry (227 2 variables), own and competitor general merchandise distribution center entry (227 2 variables), own and competitor food distribution center entry (227 2 elements), and location-speci…c population, for a total of 1817 regressors prior to implementing the model-selection embedded in CWGB. the estimated choice-speci…c value function in the corresponding period t conditional on it+1 , i.e. we seek the policy function vector 1 i 1 i1 ; :::; 1
iT 1 41 such that, for all t = 1; :::; T 1:
where V it (s t ; a it ; it+1 ) represents the nation-wide choice-speci…c value function at time t, as de…ned in the Appendix. Each 1 it is "greedy" in that it searches only for the location combinations that maximize the choice-speci…c value function in the current period conditional on the agent's future strategy it+1 , rather than the location combination policy functions that maximize the value of choices across all time periods.
In practice, given the large dimension of both a it and s t , …nding 1 i is computationally infeasible. Instead, we generate a potentially suboptimal one-step improvement policy, denoted as e 1 i e 1 i1 ; :::; e 1 iT 1 . To derive each e 1 it , we …rst compute the di¤erence in the CWGB estimated local choice and facility-speci…c value functions between placing a facility q in location l versus not,
lt ; a q ilt = 0; it+1 , for each facility type q 2 ff; g; r; scg and location l = 1; :::; L. Then, for each q, we rank these di¤erences over all locations and choose the highest ranking locations to place the pre-speci…ed number of new facilities allowed in each period.
This algorithm for choosing facility locations over all time periods represents our one-step policy improvement policy e 1 i .
Results
The models resulting from using the CWGB procedure are presented in Table 1 . Table 1 lists both the …nal coe¢ cients associated with selected state variables in each model, as well as the proportion of CWGB iterations for which univariate models of these state variables resulted in the best …t (i.e. the selection frequency). For example, during the CWGB estimation process which generated the model for general merchandise distribution centers and a g ilt = 1, i.e. b V g i e s g1 lt ; a g ilt = 1; it+1 , univariate models of the population variable were selected in 53 percent of the iterations. This table reveals three salient features of these models. The …rst is that the CWGB procedure drastically reduces the number of state variables for each model, from 1817 to an average of 7 variables. For example, one of the most parsimonious models estimated is that for regular stores with a r ilt = 1, i.e. b V r i e s r1 lt ; a r ilt = 1; it+1 , which consists of a constant, the population covariate, and indicators for own regular store entry in …ve markets: Allentown, PA, Hartford, CT, Kansas City, MO, San Francisco, CA, and Augusta, GA. This reduces the average state space cardinality per time period from more than 10 42 to 32 (2 5 ) multiplied by the cardinality of the population variable.
The second and related feature is that all models draw from a relatively small subset of the original 1816 own and competitor facility presence indicators. It is also interesting to observe which MSA indicators comprise this subset, which is made up primarily of indicators associated with medium-sized MSA's in our sample scattered across the country. What explains this pattern is that in the simulated data used for estimation, even across many simulations, only a subset of MSA's are occupied by …rm facilities. Among those occupied, occasionally, the agent experiences either heavy gains or heavy losses, which are compounded over time, since we do not allow …rms to close facilities once they are opened. These particularly successful or painful facility placements tend to produce univariate models that explain levels of the choice-speci…c value function well, which results in their selection by the CWGB procedure, typically across several models. For example, a series of particularly heavy losses were sustained by the agent as a result of placing a regular store in Augusta, GA, which induced the CWGB procedure to choose this indicator at a high frequency-25 percent, 15 percent, and 18 percent of iterations-across three di¤erent models, with each model associating this indicator with a large negative coe¢ cient. As a result, our one-step improvement policy e 1 i tended to avoid placing distribution centers and stores in this location. The third salient feature apparent from Table 1 is that population is the state variable selected most consistently. Across all CWGB models, population is selected with a frequency of roughly 53 percent in each model, while facility presence indicator variables are selected at much smaller rates. 42 For a variety of parameter speci…cations, Table 2 compares per-store revenues, operating income, margins, and costs, averaged over all time periods and simulations, for three strategies: 1) the one-step improvement policy for the agent, 2) a random choice agent strategy, where distribution centers and stores are chosen as speci…ed for it+1 (in all time periods t; :::; T 1), and 3) the competitor's strategy (benchmark). The three parameter speci…cations correspond to three scenarios: a baseline speci…cation, a high penalty for urban locations, and high distribution costs. 43 As shown in this table when comparing revenues, in the baseline scenario, the one-step improvement policy outperforms the random choice strategy by 354 percent. Similarly, it outperforms the competitor's strategy by 293 percent. In the high urban penalty and high distribution cost speci…cations, the one-step improvement policy outperforms the random choice strategy by 355 4 2 For comparison, in the Appendix (Table 8) , we estimate OLS models of the choice-speci…c value functions of interest by using only the state variables selected by the corresponding boosted regression model from Table 1 . Overall, the post selection OLS models have similar coe¢ cients to the boosted regression models. 4 3 The parameter values in the baseline speci…cation were chosen to calibrate competitor per-store returns to those actually received by Wal-Mart in the U.S. during the same time period. The high urban penalty and high distribution cost speci…cations were chosen to explore the sensitivity of the relative returns generated by our one-step improvement policy to these parameters. percent and 350 percent, respectively, and the competitor strategy by 293 percent and 294 percent, respectively. The relative returns of the one-step improvement policies seem fairly invariant to the parameter speci…cations, which is understandable since each is constructed using a choice-speci…c value function estimated under each respective parameter speci…cation. The one-step improvement policies appear to adjust the agent's behavior accordingly in response to these parameter changes. Table 3 provides a comparison of per-store revenues, operating income, margins, and costs by revenue type and strategy, averaged over all time periods and simulations in the baseline scenario, and compares these to Wal-Mart's revenue and operating income …gures for 2005. The competitor's strategy generates average operating income per store (of both types) of $4:40 million, which is similar to that actually generated by Wal-Mart in 2005 of $4:49 million, and larger than the of the random choice strategy, which generates $3:26 million. The one-step improvement policy does much better, with an operating income per store of over $18 million, corresponding to revenues per store of $244 million, versus $62 million for the competitor and $54 million for the random choice strategy. Moreover, the one-step improvement policy achieves a slightly higher operating margin than the other two strategies: 7:55 percent versus 7:09 percent for the competitor and 6:07 percent for the random choice strategy. One reason for the success of the improvement strategy appears to be that it targets higher population areas than the other strategies, which generates higher revenues in our simulation. Speci…cally, it targets MSA's with an average population of 2:39 million versus 0:84 million for the random choice strategy and 1:01 million for the competitor.
That the average population of competitor locations is relatively small is understandable, since the competitor progresses as Wal-Mart did, placing distribution centers and stores primarily in the Midwest and radiating out towards the east coast, while the improvement strategy searches for value-improving locations for distribution centers and stores in a less restricted manner across the country.
These facility placement pattern di¤erences are visually detectable in Figure 2 , which shows distribution center and store location patterns for the agent and the competitor in a representative simulation, with the agent using the one-step improvement policy. As shown in these …gures, the agent scatters distribution centers and stores across the population dense MSA's in the United States, while the competitor has a concentration of distribution centers and stores primarily in the Midwest and east coast. By the end of 2006, the agent has a strong presence on the West coast with eight facilities in California, while the competitor only opens four facilities in this region.
Although visually these pattern di¤erences seem subtle, they generate large di¤erences in revenues and operating income, as highlighted by Table 3 .
Conclusion
This paper illustrates an approach recently developed by Bajari, Jiang, and Manzanares (BJM, 2015) for deriving a one-step improvement policy for a single agent that can be used to play highdimensional dynamic Markov games in realistic settings. The approach has two attributes that make it more suitable for this task than conventional solution methods in economics. The …rst is that they impose no equilibrium restrictions on opponent behavior and instead estimate opponent strategies directly from data on past game play. This allows them to accommodate a richer set of opponent strategies than equilibrium assumptions would imply. A second is that they use a Machine Learning method to estimate opponent strategies, the law of motion, and the choice-speci…c value function for the agent. This method makes estimation of these functions feasible and reliable in high-dimensional settings, since as a consequence of estimation, the estimator regularizes the state space in a data-driven manner. Data-driven regularization proceeds by choosing the state variables most important for explaining the functions of interest, making the estimates lowdimensional approximations of the original functions. In our illustration, we show that our functions of interest are well-approximated by these low-dimensional representations, suggesting that datadriven regularization might serve as a helpful tool for economists seeking to make their models less computationally wasteful.
We use the method to derive a one-step improvement policy for a single retailer in a dynamic spatial competition game among two chain store retailers similar to the one considered by Holmes (2011). This game involves location choices for stores and distribution centers over a …nite number of time periods. This game becomes high-dimensional primarily because location choices involve complementarities across locations. For example, clustering own stores closer together can lower distribution costs but also can cannibalize own store revenues, since consumers substitute demand between nearby stores. For the same reason, nearby competitor stores lower revenues for a given store. Since we characterize the state as a vector enumerating the current network of stores and distribution centers for both competitors, the cardinality of the state becomes extremely large (on the order of 10 42 per time period), even given a relatively small number of possible locations (227).
We use the method of BJM to derive a one-step improvement policy and show that this policy generates a nearly 300 percent improvement over a strategy designed to approximate Wal-Mart's actual facility placement during the same time period (2000 to 2006). Note: The cardinality calculations represent the cardinality of the state attributable to …rm i facilities only. The cardinality attributable to …rm -i facilities is the same that attributable to …rm i facilities. The total cardinality of the state is the product of the cardinality attributable to …rm i facilities, …rm -i facilities, and the population variable.
Constraints on …rm location choices. For a given …rm i, we allow each location l to accommodate up to four …rm i facilities at one time: one import distribution center, one food distribution center, one general merchandise distribution center, and one store of either type. Symmetrically, the competitor …rm can also place up to four facilities in the same location l, for a maximum number of eight facilities per location. We assume that neither …rm can place two of its own stores (regardless of type) in one location. This approximates actual store placement patterns by big box retailers such as Wal-Mart well for small MSA's, which usually accommodate only one own-store at a time, but less so for larger MSA's, which might contain several own-stores. One additional constraint we impose is that in each period t, each …rm chooses regular stores prior to choosing supercenters. Since we allow only one …rm i store of any type per MSA, each …rm's constrained set of possible supercenter locations are a function of period t regular store location choices.
Pro…t speci…cation. For a given …rm i, sales revenues for a store in location l depend on the proximity of other …rm i stores and …rm i stores, where i denotes the competitor …rm.
Note that since we allow only one store of any kind per MSA, we can refer to a store by its location, i.e. we refer to a store in location l as store l. For store l of …rm i at time t, denote food revenues as R f ilt s sc it ; s sc it ; x lt and general merchandise revenues as R g ilt (s it ; s it ; x lt ), where s it I (s r it + s sc it > 0) with support S it , I (:) represents the indicator function, each element of s it is denoted as s ilt , s sc it and s r it were de…ned in Section 3, food revenues are a function of the proximity of supercenter locations for both …rms, general merchandise revenues are a function of the proximity of store locations of both types for both …rms, and both classes of revenue are a function location-speci…c population x lt . 44 Although we do not model consumer choice explicitly, our revenue speci…cation implies that consumers view other own-stores and competitor-stores as substitutes for any given store. 45 We assume that revenues are a function of the parameter vector # i = ( i ; i; i ; i;i ) and specify total revenues for store l and …rm i at time t in the following way:
where, respectively, where m indexes a location di¤erent from location l, and d lm represents the distance from location l to a di¤erent location m. The parameters i;i and i; i represent the average e¤ect on revenues of close-proximity own-stores and competitor-stores, respectively. Since we assume that the parameters i;i and i; i are negative, intuitively, these terms represent a deduction to revenues induced by own-stores or competitor-stores that are close in proximity to store l, since we assume that consumers view these stores as substitutes for store l. With respect to own-stores, this revenue substitution e¤ect is deemed own-store "cannibalization," which is an important dimension of chain-store location decisions as documented by Holmes (2011) for the case of Wal-Mart. With respect to competitor stores, this e¤ect re ‡ects competition. The strength of the e¤ect is weighted by d lm , with stores in locations that are farther away from store l having a smaller e¤ect on revenues than those that are close by. The indicators I fd lm 60g take a value of 1 if location m is closer than 60 miles away from location l, 0 otherwise, which imposes the assumption that stores located farther than 60 miles have no e¤ect on store l revenues. This assumption is slightly unrealistic, but we impose it since our sample only includes 227 MSA's in the U.S., which means there are few MSA's within, for example, a 30 mile radius of any MSA in our sample. With more MSA's, this cuto¤ distance can be reduced. We assume that the parameters i;i and i; i are the same across revenue categories to simplify the exposition. Both types of revenue are dependent on population at time t, x lt , through a common scalar parameter i . Additionally, since regular stores don't sell food, R f ilt = 0 for all regular stores. As in Holmes (2011), we abstract from price variation and assume each …rm sets constant prices across all own-stores and time, which is motivated by simplicity and is not necessarily far from reality for a chain-store retailer like Wal-Mart, which is known to set prices according to an every-day-low-price strategy. Denoting as the proportion of sales revenue that is net of the cost of goods sold (COGS), then R e ilt (:) represents revenues net of COGS for …rm i, store l, time t, and revenue type e 2 fg; f g.
Firms incur three types of additional costs: 1) distribution costs attributable to store sales, 2) store-level variable costs, and store-level …xed costs. In order to sell a given set of goods in time period t at store l, as in Holmes (2011), we assume that each …rm incurs distribution costs to deliver these goods from general merchandise or food distribution centers (or both for supercenters) to store l. In addition, we assume that …rms incur distribution costs when transporting these goods from import distribution centers to either general merchandise or food distribution centers. We introduce these latter distribution costs in order to model location decisions for general merchandise and food distribution centers. Denote the distribution costs incurred by …rm i to sell goods from store l at time t as DC ilt , which take the form:
Here, d g lt and d f lt represent the distance from store l to the nearest …rm i general merchandise distribution center or food distribution center, respectively. 46 Further, d imp lgt represents the distance between the general merchandise distribution center that supplies store l and the nearest import distribution center, while d imp lf t represents the distance between the food distribution center that supplies store l (if store l is a supercenter) and the nearest import distribution center. We assume that distribution costs are a …xed proportion of these distances, captured by the parameters & and , and interpret …xed distribution costs as the costs incurred to operate a truck over the course of one delivery of goods per day, aggregated over one year. This model approximates the daily truck delivery distribution model actually employed by Wal-Mart, as documented by Holmes (2011) . Finally, if store l is a regular store, &d f lt + d imp lf t = 0 since regular stores do not sell food. The remainder of our costs for both …rms are speci…ed almost exactly as in Holmes (2011) for the case of Wal-Mart, so we describe them succinctly and direct the interested reader to that work for additional description. Firms incur variable costs in the form of labor, land, and other costs (all costs not attributable to land or labor). Variable land costs are motivated by the store modi…cation patterns of Wal-Mart, which frequently changes parking lot size, building size, and shelf space to accommodate changes in sales patterns. The quantity of labor, land, and other inputs needed are assumed to be a …xed proportion of total store revenues, such that for …rm i, store l, and time t, Labor e ilt = Labor R e ilt , Land e ilt = Land R e ilt , and Other e ilt = Other R e ilt , for merchandise segment e 2 fg; f g. The prices of land and labor per unit of input are represented by wages and rents speci…c to store l at time t, denoted as wage lt and rent lt . 47 The price of the other input is normalized to 1. We focus only on …xed costs that vary by location, since costs that are constant across locations do not matter for the decision of where to locate stores and distribution centers.
As documented by Holmes (2011), there are disadvantages for big box retailers like Wal-Mart of locating stores in urban locations, including, for example, increased non big box retailer shopping options for consumers. The …xed-cost disadvantage of locating stores in urban locations is modeled as a as a function of the population density at time t of the location hosting store l, denoted as 4 6 In our game simulation, if store l is a regular store, we assume that it is supplied exclusively by the own-general merchandise distribution center in the msa physically closest to store l. Similarly, if store l is a supercenter, it is supplied exclusively by the own-food distribution center and own-general merchandise distribution center in the msa('s) closest to store l. 4 7 We collect data on rents and wages for each time period and each msa. We de…ne rents as the median (per-msa) residential home value per square-foot from Zillow (http://www.zillow.com/), and wages as the annual retail sector payroll divided by the total number of employees (per-msa), provided by the U.S. Census County Business Patterns dataset (msa level) (http://www.census.gov/econ/cbp/). Tables 4   and 5 . We then open regular stores in the two closest feasible MSA's to each newly opened …rm i general merchandise distribution center. After making this decision, we determine the closest …rm i general merchandise distribution center to each newly opened …rm i food distribution center and open supercenters in the two feasible MSA's closest to the centroid of each of these distribution center pairs.
One-
Step Improvement Policy (Algorithm Step 5). The nation-wide choice-speci…c value function is de…ned as:
The choice-speci…c value function in 6 represents nation-wide expected pro…ts conditional on the nation-wide allocation of facilities of all types, a it (and it+1 ), in contrast to the location and facility-speci…c counterpart de…ned in 1. Table 8 presents OLS models of the choice-speci…c value functions of interest using state variables selected by the corresponding boosted regression models in Table 1 and simulation data generated under the baseline speci…cation of parameters. 
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